

1

TERRORISM

First Impressions

CHAPTER LEARNING OBJECTIVES

This chapter will enable readers to do the following:

- 1.1 Demonstrate knowledge of the historical context of modern terrorist violence.
- 1.2 Discuss the significance of symbolism.
- 1.3 Explain the conceptual consideration of whether political violence is *mala prohibita* or *mala in se*.
- 1.4 Describe the moral considerations of the just war doctrine.
- 1.5 Discuss cases of terrorism and criminal skill.

Opening Viewpoint: The Ideology of Al-Qa'ida

Prior to his death in May 2011, **Osama bin Laden** established Al-Qa'ida as an international network that came to symbolize the globalization of terrorism in the 21st century. The network is perceived by many to represent a quintessential model for groups of like-minded Islamist revolutionaries who wish to wage regional and transnational insurgencies against strong adversaries. Although central Al-Qa'ida certainly exists as a loose network of relatively independent **cells**, it has also evolved into an idea—an ideology and a fighting strategy—that has been embraced by sympathetic Islamist revolutionaries and guerrilla insurgencies throughout the world. Insurgencies in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere have professed their affiliation as regional “branches” of Al-Qa'ida.

What is the ideology of Al-Qa'ida? Why did a network of religious revolutionaries evolve into a potent symbol of global resistance against its enemies? Which underlying commonalities appeal to motivated Islamist activists?

Al-Qa'ida leaders such as the late Osama bin Laden and his successor as leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri (killed during a drone strike in 2022), consistently released public pronouncements of their goals, often by delivering audio and video communiqués to international news agencies such as Al Jazeera in Qatar. They also became quite adept at using online Internet outlets and social media technologies as communications resources. Based on these communiqués, the following principles frame the ideology of Al-Qa'ida:^a

- The struggle is a clash of civilizations. Holy war is a religious duty and is necessary for the salvation of one's soul and the defense of the Muslim nation.
- Violence in a defensive war on behalf of Islam is the only course of action. There cannot be peace with the West and apostate nations.

- Islamic governments that cooperate with the West and do not adopt strict Islamic law are apostasies and must be violently overthrown.
- Because this is a just war, many of the theological and legal restrictions on the use of force by Muslims do not apply. Killing civilians in this war is acceptable.
- Only two sides exist, and there is no middle ground in this apocalyptic conflict between Islam and the forces of evil. Western and apostate Muslim nations that do not share Al-Qa'ida's vision of true Islam are enemies.
- A new pan-Islamic caliphate must be established.
- Western influence must be eliminated from the Muslim world.
- Israel is an illegitimate nation and must be destroyed.

These principles have become a rallying ideology for Islamist extremists who have few, if any, direct ties to central Al-Qa'ida. Thus, the war on terrorism is not solely a conflict against established organizations but is also a conflict against an entrenched belief system.

a. Adapted from U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2021*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2023.

Terrorism has been a dark feature of human behavior since the dawn of recorded history. Great leaders have been assassinated, groups and individuals have committed acts of incredible violence, and entire cities and nations have been put to the sword—all in the name of defending a greater good. Terrorism, however defined, has always challenged the stability of societies and the peace of mind of everyday people. In the modern era, the impact of terrorism—that is, its ability to terrorize—is not limited to the specific locales or regions where the terrorists strike. In the age of television, the Internet, social media, satellite communications, and global news coverage, graphic images of terrorist incidents are broadcast instantaneously into the homes and mobile devices of hundreds of millions of people. Terrorist groups understand the power of these images, and they manipulate them to their advantage as much as they can. Terrorist states also fully appreciate the power of instantaneous information, so they try to control the “spin” on reports of their behavior. In many respects, the 21st century is an era of globalized terrorism.

Some acts of political violence are clearly acts of terrorism. Most people would agree that politically motivated planting of bombs in marketplaces, massacres of enemy civilians, and the routine use of torture by governments are terrorist acts. As we begin our study of terrorism, we will encounter many definitional gray areas. Depending on which side of the ideological, racial, religious, or national fence one sits on, political violence can be interpreted either as an act of unmitigated terrorist barbarity or as freedom fighting and national liberation. These gray areas will be explored in the chapters that follow.

- **September 11, 2001: The Dawn of a New Era.** The death of Al-Qa'ida leader Osama bin Laden in May 2011 occurred prior to the 10th commemoration of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland. The attacks were seen by many as a turning point in the history of political violence. In the aftermath of these attacks, journalists, scholars, and national leaders repeatedly described the emergence of a new international terrorist environment. It was argued that within this new environment, terrorists were now quite capable of using—and very willing to use—weapons of mass destruction

to inflict unprecedented casualties and destruction on enemy targets. Terrorist movements also became quite adept at using social media and the Internet to recruit and inspire individuals to carry out mass-casualty attacks against “soft” civilian targets. These attacks seemed to confirm warnings from experts during the 1990s that a New Terrorism,¹ using “asymmetric” methods, would characterize the terrorist environment in the new millennium.² Asymmetric warfare is discussed further in Chapters 8 and 10.

Several questions about this new environment have arisen:

- How has the new terrorist environment affected previously observed terrorist profiles?
- How has the modern terrorist environment been affected by the collapse of revolutionary Marxism?
- Why have new motivations arisen in the modern era, such as Islamist movements, renewed ideological extremism, and nationalist advocacy?
- What is the likely impact of “stateless” international terrorism?

Readers will notice that these questions focus on terrorist *groups* and *movements*. However, it is very important to understand that terrorist *states* have been responsible for violent repression and untold millions of deaths during the 20th and 21st centuries. In addition, genocidal fighting between *communal groups* has claimed the lives of many millions more. Our exploration of terrorism, therefore, requires us to consider every facet of political violence, from low-intensity campaigns by terrorist gangs to high-intensity campaigns by terrorist governments and genocidal paramilitaries.

This chapter is a general introduction to the subject of terrorism. It is an overview—a first glance—of basic concepts that will be developed in later discussions. The following themes are introduced here and will be explored in much greater detail in subsequent chapters:

- First Considerations
- Conceptual Considerations: Understanding Political Violence
- The Past as Prologue: Historical Perspectives on Terrorism
- Terrorism and Criminal Skill: Three Cases From the Modern Era

FIRST CONSIDERATIONS

At the outset, readers must develop a basic understanding of several issues underlying the study of terrorism. These issues are ongoing topics of research and debate among scholars, government officials, the media, and social activists, and all of them will be explored in detail in later chapters. The discussion here introduces the following:

- An Overview of Extremism and Terrorism
- Terrorism at First Glance
- Sources of Extremism and Terrorism



Osama bin Laden. From the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation most-wanted terrorists website. Bin Laden was killed during a raid by a U.S. naval special forces unit in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on May 2, 2011.

NetPics/Alamy Stock Photo

An Overview of Extremism and Terrorism

Extremism is a quality that is “radical in opinion, especially in political matters; ultra; advanced.”³ It is characterized by intolerance toward opposing interests and divergent opinions, and it is the primary catalyst and motivation for terrorist behavior. Extremists who cross the line to become terrorists always develop noble arguments to rationalize and justify acts of violence directed against enemy nations, people, religions, or other interests.

Extremism is a radical expression of one’s political values. Both the *content* of one’s beliefs and the *style* in which one expresses those beliefs are basic elements for defining extremism. Laird Wilcox summed up this quality as follows:

Extremism is more an issue of style than of content. . . . Most people can hold radical or unorthodox views and still entertain them in a more or less reasonable, rational, and nondogmatic manner. On the other hand, I have met people whose views are fairly close to the political mainstream but were presented in a shrill, uncompromising, bullying, and distinctly authoritarian manner.⁴

Thus, a fundamental definitional issue for extremism is *how* one expresses an idea, in addition to the question of *which* belief one acts upon. Both elements—style and content—are important for our investigation of fringe beliefs and terrorist behavior.

Extremism is a precursor to terrorism—it is an overarching belief system terrorists use to justify their violent behavior. Extremism is characterized by what a person’s beliefs are as well as how a person expresses their beliefs. Thus, no matter how offensive or reprehensible one’s thoughts or words are, they are not by themselves acts of terrorism. Only those who violently act out their extremist beliefs are terrorists.

Terrorism would not, from a layperson’s point of view, seem to be a difficult concept to define. Most people likely hold an instinctive understanding that terrorism is


- the use of politically motivated violence,
- usually directed against **soft targets** (i.e., civilian and administrative government targets),
- to communicate a message to a larger group (i.e., “propaganda by the deed”),
- with an intention to affect (terrorize) a target audience.

This instinctive understanding would also hold that terrorism is a criminal, unfair, or otherwise illegitimate use of force. Laypersons might presume that this is an easily understood concept, but defining terrorism is *not* such a simple process. Experts have for some time grappled with designing (and agreeing on) clear definitions of terrorism; the issue has, in fact, been at the center of an ongoing debate. The result of this debate is a remarkable variety of approaches and definitions. Walter Laqueur noted that “more than a hundred definitions have been offered,” including several of his own.⁵ Even within the U.S. government, different agencies apply several definitions. These definitional problems are explored further in the next chapter.

Terrorism at First Glance

The modern era of terrorism is primarily (though not exclusively) a conflict between adversaries who on one side are waging a self-described war on terrorism and on the other side are waging a self-described holy war in defense of their religion. It is an active confrontation, as evidenced by the fact that the incidence of significant terrorist attacks often spikes to serious levels. For

example, the number of terrorist incidents worldwide has annually been documented as consistently robust, as reported by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Counterterrorism (see Figure 1.1).⁶



Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2020 Annex of Statistical Information*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2021.

Although such trends are disturbing, it is critical for one to keep these facts in perspective because the modern terrorist environment is in no manner a unique circumstance in human history.

It will become clear in the following pages that the history of terrorist behavior extends into antiquity and that common themes and concepts span the ages. State terrorism, dissident terrorism, and other types of political violence are found in all periods of human civilization. It will also become clear to readers that many common *justifications*—rooted in basic beliefs—have been used to rationalize terrorist violence throughout history. For example, the following concepts hold true regardless of the contexts of history, culture, or region:

- Those who practice revolutionary violence and state repression always claim to champion noble causes and values.
- Policies that advocate extreme violence always cite righteous goals to justify their behavior, such as the need to defend a religious faith or defend the human rights of a people.
- The perpetrators of violent acts uniformly maintain that they are freedom fighters (in the case of revolutionaries) or the champions of law and social order (in the case of governments).



Hijacked United Airlines Flight 175 from Boston crashes into the south tower of the World Trade Center and explodes at 9:03 a.m. on September 11, 2001, in New York City.

Spencer Platt/Getty Images

Sources of Extremism and Terrorism

The underlying causes of terrorism have also been the subject of extensive discussion, debate, and research. This is perhaps because the study of the sources of terrorism spans many disciplines—including sociology, psychology, criminology, and political science. The causes of terrorism will be explored in detail in Chapter 3. For now, a general model will serve as a starting point for developing our understanding of which factors lead to terrorist violence. To begin, we must understand that “political violence, including terrorism, has systemic origins that can be ameliorated. Social and economic pressures, frustrated political aspirations, and in a more proximate sense, the personal experiences of terrorists and their relations, all contribute to the terrorist reservoir.”⁷

Nehemia Friedland designed “a convenient framework for the analysis of the antecedents of political terrorism,” outlined as follows: “First, terrorism is a group phenomenon . . . perpetrated by organized groups whose members have a clear group identity—national, religious or ideological. . . . Second, political terrorism has its roots in intergroup conflict. . . . Third, ‘insurgent terrorism,’ unlike ‘state terrorism,’ . . . is a ‘strategy of the weak.’”⁸

One should appreciate that these issues continue to be a source of intensive debate. Nevertheless, working definitions have been adopted as a matter of logical necessity. Let us presume for now that terrorist acts are grounded in extremist beliefs that arise from group identity, intergroup conflict, and a chosen strategy.⁹

CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS: UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The term *terrorism* has acquired a decidedly pejorative meaning in the modern era, so that few if any states or groups that espouse political violence ever refer to themselves as terrorists. Nevertheless, these same states and groups can be unabashedly extremist in their beliefs or violent in their behavior. They often invoke—and manipulate—images of a malevolent threat or unjust conditions to justify their actions. The question is whether these justifications are morally satisfactory (and thereby validate extremist violence) or whether terrorism is inherently wrong.

The Significance of Symbolism

Symbolism is a central feature of terrorism. Most terrorist targets at some level symbolize the righteousness of the terrorists’ cause and the evil of the opponent they are fighting. Symbolism can be used to rationalize acts of extreme violence and can be manipulated to fit any number of targets into the category of an enemy interest. Terrorists are also very mindful of their image and skillfully conduct public relations and propaganda campaigns to “package” themselves. Modern terrorists and their supporters have become quite adept at crafting symbolic meaning from acts of violence.

Symbolism can create abstract ideological linkages between terrorists and their victims. This process was seen during the wave of kidnappings by Latin American leftists during the 1970s, when terrorists seized civilian business executives and diplomats who the kidnappers said symbolized capitalism and exploitation. Symbolic targets can also represent enemy social or political establishments, as in the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA’s) assassination of Lord Louis Mountbatten (the uncle of Prince Philip Mountbatten, husband of Queen Elizabeth II) in 1979 and the IRA’s attempted assassination of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1984. In some cases, entire groups of people can be symbolically labeled and slaughtered, as during the

genocides of the **Nazi Holocaust** (pseudo-racial), in the killing fields of Cambodia (social and ideological), in Rwanda (ethnic and social), in the Darfur region of Sudan (ethno-religious), and against the Rohingya people in Myanmar (ethno-religious).



An elderly Rohingya Muslim man carries his grandson as they walk in an alley at a camp for Rohingya people in Ukhiya, near Cox's Bazar, a southern coastal district 296 kilometers (183 miles) south of Dhaka, Bangladesh.

AP Photo/A.M. Ahad

Political Violence: *Mala Prohibita* or *Mala in Se*?

It is helpful to use two concepts from the field of criminal justice administration. In criminal law, the terms *mala prohibita* and *mala in se*¹⁰ are applied to behaviors that society defines as deviant acts. They represent concepts that are very useful for the study of terrorism.

- **Mala prohibita** acts are “crimes that are made illegal by legislation.”¹¹ These acts are illegal because society has declared them to be wrong; they are not inherently immoral, wicked, or evil. Examples include laws prohibiting gambling and prostitution, which are considered to be moral prohibitions against socially unacceptable behaviors rather than prohibitions of fundamental evils.
- **Mala in se** acts are crimes “that are immoral or wrong in themselves.”¹² These acts cannot be justified in civilized society, and they have no acceptable qualities. For example, premeditated murder and rape are *mala in se* crimes. They will never be legalized.

Are terrorist methods fundamentally evil? Perhaps so, because terrorism commonly evokes images of maximum violence against innocent victims carried out in the name of a higher cause. However, is terrorist violence always such a bad thing? Are not some causes worth fighting for? Killing for? Dying for? Is not terrorism simply a matter of one's point of view? Most would agree that basic values such as freedom and liberty are indeed worth fighting for, and sometimes killing or dying for. If so, perhaps “where you stand depends on where you sit.” Thus, if the bombs are falling on your head, is it not an act of terrorism? If the bombs are falling on an enemy's head in the name of your freedom, how can it possibly be terrorism?

Conceptually, right and wrong behaviors are not always relative considerations, for many actions are indeed *mala in se*. However, this is not an easy analysis because violence committed by genuinely oppressed people can arguably raise questions of *mala prohibita* as a matter of perspective.

The Just War Doctrine

The **just war doctrine** is an ideal and a moralistic philosophy. It represents “a body of thought that addresses the rights and wrongs of warfare.”¹³ Throughout history, nations and individuals have gone to war with the belief that their cause was just and their opponents’ cause unjust. Similarly, attempts have been made for millennia to write fair and just laws of war and rules of engagement. For example, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the **Hague Conventions** produced at least 21 international agreements on the rules of war.¹⁴ In the modern era, the concept is often used by ideological, ethnonational, and religious extremists to justify acts of extreme violence.

This is a moral and ethical issue that raises the questions of whether one can ethically attack an opponent, how one can justifiably defend oneself with force, and what types of force are morally acceptable in either context. The just war debate also asks who can morally be defined as an enemy and what kinds of targets it is morally acceptable to attack. In this regard, there are three separate components to the concept of just war (which philosophers call the “just war tradition”): the rationale for initiating the war (a war’s ends), the method of warfare (a war’s means), and rebuilding after the war (restoring peace after the war). Criteria for whether a war is just are divided into **jus ad bellum** (justice of war), **jus in bello** (justice in war), and **jus post bellum** (justice after war) criteria.¹⁵

Thus, *jus ad bellum* is having the correct conditions for waging war in the first place, and *jus in bello* is correct behavior while waging war. *Jus post bellum* is correct behavior after conflict and the transition to peace. These concepts have been debated by philosophers and theologians for centuries. The early Christian philosopher **Saint Augustine** of Hippo (in modern-day Algeria) concluded in the 5th century that war is justified to punish injuries inflicted by a nation that has refused to correct wrongs committed by its citizens.¹⁶ The Christian religious tradition, especially that of the Roman Catholic Church, has devoted a great deal of intellectual effort to clarifying Augustine’s concept. Augustine was, of course, referring to warfare between nations and cities, and Church doctrine long held that an attack against state authority was an offense against God.¹⁷ Likewise, The Hague Conventions dealt only with rules of conflict between nations and afforded no legal rights to spies or antistate rebels. Neither system referred to rules of engagement for nonstate or antistate conflicts.

In the modern era, both dissidents and states have adapted the just war tradition to their political environments. Antistate conflict and reprisals by states are commonplace. Dissidents always consider their cause just and their methods proportional to the force used by the agents of their oppressors. They are, in their own minds, freedom fighters waging a just war. As one Hamas fighter said, “Before I start shooting, I start to concentrate on reading verses of the Koran because the Koran gives me the courage to fight the Israelis.”¹⁸

Antiterrorist reprisals launched by states are also justified as appropriate and proportional applications of force—in this case, as a means to root out bands of terrorists. For example, after three suicide bombers killed or wounded scores of people in Jerusalem and Haifa in December 2001, Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon justified Israeli reprisals by saying, “A war of terrorism was forced on us [by the terrorists]. . . . If you ask what the aim of this war is, I will tell you. It is the aim of the terrorists . . . to exile us from here. . . . This will not happen.”¹⁹

From the perspective of terrorism and counterterrorism, both dissident and state applications of force are legitimate subjects of just war scrutiny, especially because dissidents usually attack soft civilian targets and state reprisals are usually not directed against standing armies. The following “moral checklist” was published in the American newspaper *The Christian Science Monitor* during the first phase of the war on terrorism begun after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks:

- Is it justified to attack states and overturn regimes to get at terrorists?
- Can the U.S. legitimately target political figures like Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar?
- What are U.S. obligations in terms of minimizing civilian casualties?
- What type of force should be used?
- When should U.S. forces take prisoners, rather than killing Afghan troops?
- Is there a plan for peace?²⁰

These questions are generically applicable to all state antiterrorist campaigns as well as to antistate dissident violence. Rules of war and the just war tradition are the result of many motivations. Some rules and justifications are self-serving, others are pragmatic, and still others are grounded in ethnonationalist or religious traditions. Hence, the just war concept can easily be adapted to justify ethnic, racial, national, and religious extremism in the modern era.

THE PAST AS PROLOGUE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

The Historical Scope of Violence

Conflict between societies has been an attribute of human interaction from the dawn of history. When humans lived primarily within tribes, clans, or social groups, conflict was conducted in a relatively controlled and lower scale of violence. The evolution of settled societies and large populations witnessed a concomitant increase in intensities of conflict. Ancient city-states and empires fought both limited and total wars, and they violently suppressed dissent when deemed necessary. Medieval societies regularly employed brutal tactics when waging war, occasionally resulting in regional declines in population. In the modern era, the 20th century witnessed a convergence of political violence waged by nations and insurgencies, using modern weaponry and technology, resulting in unprecedented casualties and destruction. During the 21st century, mass casualty attacks against civilian populations became commonplace, carried out by dissidents and states.

Whether the appellation of *terrorism* is applied to ancient and modern examples of political violence, there is little debate about the striking similarities in motives, origins, and rationales for extreme beliefs and violent behavior. From the perspective of the perpetrators of such violence, it has always been a justifiable practice. From the perspective of victims of political violence, there has been universal condemnation. Thus, the historical scope of violence is a continuum of similar moral and political rationalizations used to justify behavior that would be classified as terrorism in the modern era.

It is perhaps natural for each generation to view history narrowly, from within its own political context. Contemporary commentators and laypersons tend to interpret modern events as though they have no historical precedent. However, terrorism is by no means a modern phenomenon; in fact, it has a long history. Nor does terrorism arise in a political vacuum. Let us consider a brief summary of several historical periods to illustrate the global and timeless sweep of terrorist behavior.

Antiquity

In the ancient world, cases and stories of state repression and political violence were common. Several ancient writers championed **tyrannicide** (the killing of tyrants) as for the greater good of the citizenry and to delight the gods. Some assassins were honored by the public. For example, when the tyrant Hipparchus was assassinated by Aristogeiton and Harmodius, statues were erected to honor them after their executions.²¹ Conquerors often set harsh examples by exterminating entire populations or forcing the conquered into exile. An example of this practice is the Babylonian Exile, which followed the conquest of the kingdom of Judea. Babylon's victory resulted in the forced removal of the Judean population to Babylon in 598 and 587 BCE. Those in authority also repressed the expression of ideas from individuals whom they deemed dangerous, sometimes violently. In ancient Greece, Athenian authorities sentenced the great philosopher Socrates to death in 399 BCE for allegedly corrupting the city-state's youth and meddling in religious affairs. He drank hemlock and died among his students and followers.

The Roman Age

During the time of the Roman Empire, the political world was rife with many violent demonstrations of power, which were arguably examples of what we would now call state terrorism or genocide. These include the brutal suppression of Spartacus's followers after the Servile War of 73–71 BCE, after which the Romans crucified surviving rebels along the Appian Way's route to Rome. **Crucifixion** was used as a form of public execution by Rome for offenses committed against Roman authority and involved affixing condemned persons to a cross or other wooden platform. The condemned were either nailed through the wrist or hand or tied on the platform; they died by suffocation as their bodies sagged. Crucifixion was considered to be a shameful death and was generally reserved for slaves and rebels, so Roman citizens were usually exempted from execution by crucifixion.

Warfare was waged in an equally hard manner, as evidenced by the final conquest of the North African city-state of Carthage in 146 BCE. The city was reportedly allowed to burn for 10 days, the rubble was cursed, and salt was symbolically ploughed into the soil to signify that Carthage would forever remain desolate. During another successful campaign in 106 CE, the Dacian nation (modern Romania) was eliminated, its population was enslaved, and many Dacians perished in gladiatorial games. In other conquered territories, conquest was often accompanied by similar demonstrations of terror, always with the intent to demonstrate that Roman rule would be imposed without mercy against those who did not submit to the authority of the empire. Julius Caesar claimed in his *Commentarii de Bello Gallico*²² to have exterminated Germanic tribes numbering 430,000 people at the Rhine river in 55 BCE during his conquest of Gaul. In essence, Roman conquest was predicated on the alternatives of unconditional surrender by adversaries or their annihilation.

Regicide (the killing of kings) was also common during the Roman age. Perhaps the best-known political incident in ancient Rome was the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE by rivals in the Senate. Other Roman emperors also met violent fates: Caligula and Galba were killed by the Praetorian Guard in 41 and 68 CE, respectively; Domitian was stabbed to death in

96 CE; a paid gladiator murdered Commodus in 193 CE; and Caracalla, Elagabalus, and many other emperors either were assassinated or died suspiciously.²³ These events were rather common in Roman political culture, as evidenced by the fact that at least 23 emperors are known to have claimed imperial supremacy between 235 CE and 284 CE.

The Ancient and Medieval Middle East

Cases exist of movements in the ancient and medieval Middle East that used what modern analysts would consider to be terrorist tactics. For example, in *History of the Jewish War*—a seven-volume account of the first Jewish rebellion against Roman occupation (66–73 CE)—the historian Flavius Josephus describes how one faction of the rebels, the **sicarii** (named after their preferred use of *sica*, or short, curved daggers), attacked both Romans and members of the Jewish establishment.²⁴ They were masters of guerrilla warfare and the destruction of symbolic property, and they belonged to a group known as the **Zealots** (from the Greek *zeLOS*, meaning ardor or strong spirit), who opposed the Roman occupation of Palestine. The modern term *zealot*, used to describe uncompromising devotion to radical change, is derived from the name of this group. Assassination was a commonly used tactic. Some *sicarii* zealots were present at the siege of Masada, a hilltop fortress that held out against the Romans for 3 years before the defenders committed suicide in 74 CE rather than surrender.

Another important historical case, the Order of Assassins in 13th-century Persia, is discussed in Chapter 6. Both the Zealots and Assassins are important historical examples because they continue to inform modern analyses of terrorist violence and motives.

The Dark Ages: Prelude to Modern Terrorism

During the period from the Assassins (13th century) to the French Revolution (18th century), behavior that would later be considered terrorism was commonly practiced in medieval warfare. In fact, a great deal of medieval conflict involved openly brutal warfare. However, the modern terrorist profile of politically motivated dissidents attempting to change an existing order, or state repression to preserve state hegemony, was uncommon. Nation-states in the modern sense did not exist in medieval Europe, and recurrent warfare was motivated by religious intolerance and political discord between feudal kings and lords. The post-Assassin Middle East also witnessed periodic invasions, discord between leaders, and religious warfare, but not modern-style terrorism. It was not until the rise of the modern nation-state in the mid-17th century that the range of intensity of conflict devolved from open warfare to include behavior the modern era would define as insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism.

The French Revolution

During the French Revolution, the word *terrorism* was coined in its modern context by British statesman and philosopher Edmund Burke. He used the word to describe the *régime de la terreur*, commonly known in English as the **Reign of Terror** (June 1793 to July 1794).²⁵ The Reign of Terror, led by the radical Jacobin-dominated government, is a good example of state terrorism carried out to further the goals of a revolutionary ideology.²⁶ During the Terror, thousands of opponents to the Jacobin dictatorship—and others merely perceived to be enemies of the new revolutionary Republic—were arrested and put on trial before a **Revolutionary Tribunal**. Those found to be enemies of the Republic were beheaded by a new instrument of execution—the guillotine. The guillotine had the capability to execute victims one after the other in assembly-line fashion and was regarded by Jacobins and other revolutionaries at the time as an enlightened and civilized tool of revolutionary justice because it provided a quick death.²⁷

The ferocity of the Reign of Terror is reflected in the number of victims: Between 17,000 and 40,000 persons were executed, and perhaps 200,000 political prisoners died in prisons from disease and starvation.²⁸ Two incidents illustrate the communal nature of this violence: In Lyon, 700 people were massacred by cannon fire in the town square, and in Nantes, thousands were drowned in the Loire River when the boats in which they were detained were sunk.²⁹

The Revolutionary Tribunal is a symbol of revolutionary justice and state terrorism that has its modern counterparts in 20th-century social upheavals. Recent examples include the “**struggle meetings**” in revolutionary China (public criticism sessions, involving public humiliation and confession) and the **komiteh** (ad hoc “people’s committee”) of revolutionary Iran.³⁰

CHAPTER PERSPECTIVE 1.1

THE GUNPOWDER PLOT OF GUY FAWKES^a

The reign of James I, King of England from 1603 to 1625, took place in the aftermath of a religious upheaval. During the previous century, King Henry VIII (1509–1547) wrested from Parliament the authority to proclaim himself the head of religious affairs in England. King Henry had requested permission from Pope Clement VII to annul his marriage to Catherine of Aragon when she failed to give birth to a male heir to the throne. His intention was to then marry Anne Boleyn. When the Pope refused his request, Henry proclaimed the Church of England and separated the new church from papal authority. The English crown confiscated Catholic Church property and shut down Catholic monasteries. English Catholics who failed to swear allegiance to the crown as supreme head of the church were repressed by Henry and later by Queen Elizabeth I (1558–1603).

When James I was proclaimed king, Guy Fawkes and other conspirators plotted to assassinate him. They meticulously smuggled gunpowder into the Palace of Westminster, intending to blow it up along with King James and any other officials in attendance on the opening day of Parliament. Unfortunately for Fawkes, one of his fellow plotters attempted to send a note to warn his brother-in-law to stay away from Westminster on the appointed day. The note was intercepted, and Fawkes was captured on November 5, 1605, while guarding the store of gunpowder.

Guy Fawkes suffered the English penalty for treason. He was dragged through the streets, hanged until nearly dead, his bowels were drawn from him, and he was cut into quarters—an infamous process known as hanging, drawing, and quartering. Fawkes had known that this would be his fate, so when the noose was placed around his neck he took a running leap, hoping to break his neck. Unfortunately, the rope broke, and the executioner proceeded with the full ordeal.

^a For a history of the life and times of Guy Fawkes and the Gunpowder Plot, see Holland, Nick. *The Real Guy Fawkes*. South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword Books, 2017.

Nineteenth-Century Europe: Two Examples From the Left

Modern, left-wing terrorism is not a product of the 20th century. Its ideological ancestry dates to the 19th century, when anarchist and communist philosophers began to advocate the destruction of capitalist and imperial society—what Karl Marx referred to as the “spectre . . . haunting Europe.”³¹ Some revolutionaries readily encouraged the use of terrorism in the new cause. One theorist, Karl Heinzen in Germany, anticipated the late-20th century fear that terrorists might obtain weapons of mass destruction when he supported the acquisition of new weapons

technologies to utterly destroy the enemies of the people. According to Heinzen, these weapons could include poison gas and new, high-yield explosives.³²


During the 19th century, several terrorist movements championed the rights of the lower classes. These movements were prototypes for 20th-century groups and grew out of social and political environments that were unique to their countries. To illustrate this point, the following two cases are drawn from early industrial England and the semifeudal Russian context of the late 19th century.

The **Luddites** were English workers in the early 1800s who objected to the social and economic transformations of the Industrial Revolution. Their principal objection was that industrialization threatened their jobs, so they targeted the machinery of the new textile factories. Textile mills and weaving machinery were disrupted and sabotaged. For example, they attacked stocking looms that mass-produced stockings at the expense of skilled stocking weavers who made them by hand.

A mythical figure, Ned Ludd, was the supposed founder of the Luddite movement. The movement was active from 1811 to 1816 and was responsible for sabotaging and destroying wool and cotton mills. The British government eventually suppressed the movement by passing anti-Luddite laws, including establishing the crime of “machine breaking,” which was punishable by death. After 17 Luddites were executed in 1813, the movement gradually faded out. Although historians debate whether Luddites clearly fit the profile of terrorists, modern antitechnology activists and terrorists, such as the Unabomber in the United States, are sometimes referred to as neo-Luddites.

People’s Will (Narodnaya Volya) in Russia was a direct outgrowth of student dissatisfaction with the czarist regime in the late 19th century. Many young Russian university students, some of whom had studied abroad, became imbued with the ideals of anarchism and Marxism. Many of these students became radical reformists who championed the rights of the people, particularly the peasant class. A populist revolutionary society, Land and Liberty (*Zemlya Volya*), was founded in 1876 with the goal of fomenting a mass peasant uprising by settling radical students among them to raise their class consciousness. After a series of arrests and mass public trials, Land and Liberty split into two factions in 1879. One faction, Black Repartition, kept to the goal of a peasant revolution. The other faction, People’s Will, fashioned itself into a conspiratorial terrorist organization.

People’s Will members believed that they understood the underlying problems of Russia better than the uneducated masses of people did, and they concluded that they were therefore better able to force government change. This was, in fact, one of the first examples of a revolutionary vanguard strategy. They believed that they could both demoralize the czarist government and expose its weaknesses to the peasantry. People’s Will quickly embarked on a terrorist campaign against carefully selected targets. Incidents of terror committed by People’s Will members—and other revolutionaries who emulated them—included shootings, knifings, and bombings against government officials. In one successful attack, Czar Alexander II was assassinated by a terrorist bomb on March 1, 1881. The immediate outcome of the terrorist campaign was the installation of a repressive police state in Russia that, although not as efficient as later police states would be in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, succeeded in harassing and imprisoning most members of People’s Will.



U.S. President William McKinley is shot on September 6, 1901, by anarchist Leon Czolgosz, who hid his gun in a handkerchief and fired as the president approached to shake his hand. McKinley died eight days later.

DEA/A. DAGLI ORTI/De Agostini via Getty Images

The Modern Era and the War on Terrorism

It is clear from human history that terrorism is deeply woven into the fabric of social and political conflict. This quality has not changed, and in the modern world, states and targeted populations are challenged by the New Terrorism, which is characterized by the following:

- loose cell-based networks, which by design have minimal lines of command and control
- desired acquisition of high-intensity weapons and weapons of mass destruction
- politically vague, religious, or mystical motivations
- asymmetric methods that maximize casualties
- skillful use of the Internet and social media, and manipulation of the mass media

The New Terrorism should be contrasted with traditional terrorism, which is typically characterized by the following:

- clearly identifiable organizations or movements
- use of conventional weapons, usually small arms and explosives
- explicit grievances championing specific classes or ethnonational groups
- relatively “surgical” selection of targets

New information technologies and the Internet create unprecedented opportunities for terrorist groups, and violent extremists have become adept at bringing their wars into the homes of literally hundreds of millions of people. Those who specialize in suicide bombings, vehicular bombings, or mass-casualty attacks correctly calculate that carefully selected targets will attract the attention of a global audience. Thus, cycles of violence not only disrupt normal routines; they also produce long periods of global awareness. Such cycles can be devastating. For example, during the winter and spring of 2005, Iraqi suicide bombings increased markedly in intensity and frequency, from 69 in April 2005 (a record rate at that time) to 90 in May.³³ Likewise, the renewal of sectarian violence in 2014, exacerbated by intensive combat with ISIS, was a reinvigoration of the sectarian bloodletting that occurred during the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq in the early 2000s.³⁴ These attacks resulted in many casualties, including hundreds of deaths, and greatly outpaced the previous cycle of car bombings by more than two to one.

All of these threats offer new challenges for policy makers about how to respond to the behavior of terrorist states, groups, and individuals. The war on terrorism, launched in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, seemed to herald a new resolve to end terrorism. This has proven to be a difficult task. The war has been fought on many levels, as exemplified by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the disruption of terrorist cells on several continents. There have been many serious terrorist strikes such as those in Madrid, Spain; Bali, Indonesia; London, England; Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt; Paris, France; Brussels, Belgium; Christchurch, New Zealand, and Orlando, United States. In addition, differences arose within the post-September 11 alliance, creating significant strains. It is clear that the war will be a long-term prospect, likely with many unanticipated events. Table 1.1 reports the scale of terrorist violence in 2018 to 2020 for 10 countries with the most active terrorist environments for that period.

TABLE 1.1 ■ Ten Countries With the Most Terrorist Incidents, 2018–2020

Top Countries	Incidents			Three-Year Change
	2018	2019	2020	
1 Afghanistan	1,295	1,748	1,722	33% ▲
2 Syria	875	1,051	1,332	52% ▲
3 Democratic Republic of Congo	187	384	999	434% ▲
4 Yemen	224	396	835	273% ▲
5 India	673	655	679	1% ▲
6 Iraq	765	542	629	-18% ▼
7 Somalia	528	486	504	-5% ▼
8 Nigeria	546	460	390	-29% ▼
9 Philippines	351	359	362	3% ▲
10 Mali	164	225	253	54% ▲
Subtotal	5,608	6,306	7,705	22% ▲
Year-end total	8,117	8,872	10,172	15% ▲

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2020 Annex of Statistical Information*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2021.

TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL SKILL: THREE CASES FROM THE MODERN ERA

Terrorism is condemned internationally as an illegal use of force and an illegitimate expression of political will. Applying this concept of illegality, one can argue that terrorists are criminals and that terrorist attacks require some degree of criminal skill. For example, the radical Islamist network *Al-Qa'ida* set up an elaborate financial system to sustain its activities. This financial system included secret bank accounts, front companies, offshore bank accounts, and charities.³⁵ *Al-Qa'ida* is an example of a stateless movement that became a self-sustaining revolutionary network. It is also an example of a sophisticated transnational criminal enterprise.

Terrorist attacks involve different degrees of criminal skill. The following cases are examples of the wide range of sophistication found in incidents of political violence. All three cases are short illustrations of the criminal skill of the following individual extremists:

- Brenton Harrison Tarrant, an Australian racial supremacist who attacked two Muslim mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, in March 2019
- Ted Kaczynski, also known as the Unabomber, who was famous for sending mail bombs to his victims and who eluded capture for 18 years, from 1978 to 1996
- Ramzi Yousef, an international terrorist who was the mastermind behind the first World Trade Center bombing, in February 1993

Case 1: Brenton Harrison Tarrant

Many terrorist incidents are the acts of individual extremists who simply embark on killing sprees, using a relatively *low degree* of criminal sophistication. For example, domestic “lone-wolf” attacks in Europe and the United States have usually been ideological or racially motivated killing sprees committed by individual extremists who are often extreme nationalists, neofascists, neo-Nazis, or racial supremacists.³⁶ One of these attacks occurred on March 15, 2019, in Christchurch, New Zealand, when a right-wing racial supremacist murdered 51 people.

Brenton Harrison Tarrant, a white racial supremacist, entered two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, and began shooting worshippers. His victims were targeted because they were Muslims. Significantly, Tarrant livestreamed the first attack on Facebook. Prior to the attack he uploaded an 87-page online manifesto titled “The Great Replacement.” The sequence of Tarrant’s assault occurred as follows:

- Tarrant entered the Al Noor Mosque and began shooting worshippers. About 190 people were inside.
- Tarrant left the Al Noor Mosque and drove to the Linwood Islamic Centre. He first fired his weapons through a window but then entered the building after retrieving a weapon from his vehicle. About 100 worshippers were inside.
- Tarrant was captured by the police after he left the Linwood Islamic Centre and drove toward a third mosque. The police rammed his vehicle prior to his capture.
- Tarrant livestreamed his attacks for 17 minutes on Facebook.

In March 2020 Tarrant pled guilty to 51 murders, 49 attempted murders, and engaging in a terrorist act. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.

The Tarrant case illustrates how the lone-wolf scenario involves an individual who believes in a certain ideology but who is not acting on behalf of an organized group. These individuals tend to exhibit a relatively low degree of criminal skill while carrying out their assault.

Case 2: Theodore “Ted” Kaczynski

Using a *medium degree* of criminal sophistication, many terrorists have been able to remain active for long periods of time without being captured by security agents. Some enter into “retirement” during this time, whereas others remain at least sporadically active. An example of the latter profile is **Theodore “Ted” Kaczynski**, popularly known as the Unabomber. The term *Unabomber* was derived from the FBI’s designation of his case as **UNABOM** during its investigation of his activities.

In May 1978, Kaczynski began constructing and detonating a series of bombs directed against corporations and universities. His usual practice was to send the devices through the mail disguised as business parcels. Examples of his attacks include the following:

- A bomb caught fire inside a mail bag aboard a Boeing 727. It had been rigged with a barometric trigger to explode at a certain altitude.
- A package bomb exploded inside the home of the president of United Airlines, injuring him.

- A letter bomb exploded at Vanderbilt University, injuring a secretary. It had been addressed to the chair of the computer science department.
- A University of California, Berkeley, professor was severely injured when a pipe bomb he found in the faculty room exploded.
- Two University of Michigan scholars were injured when a package bomb exploded at a professor's home. The bomb had been designed to look like a book manuscript.
- An antipersonnel bomb exploded in the parking lot behind a computer rental store, killing the store's owner.

During an 18-year period, Ted Kaczynski was responsible for the detonation of more than 16 bombs around the country, killing three people and injuring 23 more (some very seriously). During this period Kaczynski authored a 35,000-word manifesto titled "Industrial Society and Its Future." The manifesto was published by the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* in 1995 on his vow to suspend his violent campaign. Kaczynski was arrested in his Montana cabin in April 1996. Kaczynski was sentenced in May 1998 to four consecutive life terms plus 30 years under a plea agreement in lieu of a death sentence and incarcerated in the ADX "supermaximum" federal prison in Florence, Colorado. Kaczynski died in Federal Medical Center Butner, a prison medical facility, in June 2023.

Case 3: Ramzi Yousef


Involving a *high degree* of criminal sophistication, some terrorist attacks are the work of individuals who can be described as masters of their criminal enterprise. The following case illustrates this concept.

On February 26, 1993, Abdul Basit Mahmoud Abdul Karim, better known as **Ramzi Yousef**, detonated a bomb in a parking garage beneath Tower One of the World Trade Center in New York City. The bomb was a mobile truck bomb that Yousef and an associate had constructed in New Jersey from a converted Ford Econoline van. It was of a fairly simple design but extremely powerful. The detonation occurred as follows:

The critical moment came at 12:17 and 37 seconds. One of the fuses burnt to its end and ignited the gunpowder in an Atlas Rockmaster blasting cap. In a split second the cap exploded with a pressure of around 15,000 lbs per square inch, igniting in turn the first nitro-glycerin container of the bomb, which erupted with a pressure of about 150,000 lbs per square inch—the equivalent of about 10,000 atmospheres. In turn, the nitro-glycerin ignited cardboard boxes containing a witches' brew of urea pellets and sulphuric acid.³⁷

According to investigators and other officials, Yousef's objective was to topple Tower One onto Tower Two "like a pair of dominoes,"³⁸ release a cloud of toxic gas, and thus achieve a very high death toll.

Ramzi Yousef, apparently born in Kuwait and reared in Pakistan, was an activist educated in the United Kingdom. His education was interrupted during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, when he apparently "spent several months in Peshawar [Pakistan] in training camps funded by Osama bin Laden learning bomb-making skills."³⁹ After the war, Yousef returned to school in the United Kingdom and received a Higher National Diploma in computer-aided electrical engineering.



Ramzi Yousef, master terrorist and mastermind of the first bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993.

Rick Maiman/Sygma via Getty Images

In the summer of 1991, Ramzi Yousef returned to the training camps in Peshawar for additional training in electronics and explosives. He arrived in New York City in September 1992 and shortly thereafter began planning to carry out a significant attack, having selected the World Trade Center as his target. Yousef established contacts with former associates already in the New York area and eventually became close to Muhammed Salameh, who assisted in the construction of the bomb. They purchased chemicals and other bomb-making components, stored them in a rented locker, and assembled the bomb in an apartment in Jersey City. They apparently tested considerably scaled-down versions of the bomb several times. After the attack, Yousef boarded a flight at JFK Airport and flew to Pakistan.

This case is a good example of the technical skill and criminal sophistication of some terrorists. Ramzi Yousef had connections with well-funded terrorists, was a sophisticated bomb maker, knew how to obtain the necessary components in a foreign country, was very adept at evasion, and obviously planned his actions in meticulous detail. As a postscript, Ramzi Yousef remained very active among bin Laden's associates, and his travels within the movement took him far afield, including trips to Thailand and the Philippines. In an example of international law enforcement cooperation, he was eventually captured in Pakistan in February 1995 and sent to the United States to stand trial for the bombing. Yousef was tried, convicted, and sentenced to serve two life sentences plus 240 years in prison in the ADX supermaximum federal prison in Florence, Colorado.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

As a first consideration, this chapter introduced readers to an overview of extremism and terrorism, whereby their sources and interrelationship were summarized; these subjects are explored in detail in subsequent chapters. Conceptual considerations include the symbolism and criminality of political violence as well as the concept of the just war. Whether terrorist acts are *mala in se* or *mala prohibita* is often a relative question. Depending on one's perspective, there are gray areas that challenge us to be objective about the true nature of political violence.

Some of the historical and modern attributes of terrorism were also discussed, with a central theme that terrorism is deeply rooted in human experience. The impact of extremist ideas on human behavior should not be underestimated because there are historical examples of political violence that in some ways parallel modern terrorism. For example, we noted that state terrorism and antistate dissident movements have existed since ancient times.

Most, if not all, nations promote an ideological doctrine to legitimize the power of the state and to convince the people that their systems of belief are worthy of loyalty, sacrifice, and (when necessary) violent defense. Conversely, when a group of people perceives that an alternative ideology or condition should be promoted, revolutionary violence may occur against the defenders of the established rival order. In neither case would those who commit acts of political violence consider themselves to be unjustified in their actions, and they certainly would not label themselves terrorists.

In Chapter 2, readers will be challenged to probe the nature of terrorism more deeply. The discussion will center on the importance of perspective and the question of how to define terrorism.

KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

The following topics are discussed in this chapter and can be found in the glossary:

cells	regicide
crucifixion	Reign of Terror
extremism	Revolutionary Tribunal
Hague Conventions	sicarii
jus ad bellum	soft targets
jus in bello	“struggle meetings”
jus post bellum	symbolism
just war doctrine	terrorism
komiteh	total war
mala in se	tyrannicide
mala prohibita	UNABOM
Nazi Holocaust	

PROMINENT PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

The following names and organizations are discussed in this chapter and can be found in Appendix B:

Al-Qa'ida	Saint Augustine
bin Laden, Osama	Tarrant, Brenton Harrison
Kaczynski, Theodore “Ted”	Yousef, Ramzi
Luddites	Zealots
People’s Will (Narodnaya Volya)	

DISCUSSION BOX

TOTAL WAR

This chapter’s Discussion Box is intended to stimulate critical debate about the legitimacy of using extreme force against civilian populations.

Total war is “warfare that uses all possible means of attack, military, scientific, and psychological, against both enemy troops and civilians.”^a Total war is especially common in communal conflicts and involves the deliberate targeting of “enemy” civilian populations.

Total war was the prevailing military doctrine applied by combatant nations during the Second World War and was prosecuted by marshalling a total mobilization of industrial and human resources. Allied and Axis military planners specifically targeted civilian populations. In the cases of German and Japanese strategists, the war was fought as much against indigenous populations as against opposing armies. The massacres and genocide directed against civilian populations at Auschwitz, Dachau, Warsaw, Lidice, and Nanking—and countless other atrocities—are a dark legacy of the 20th century.

The estimated number of civilians killed during the war is staggering.^b

Belgium	90,000
Britain	70,000
China	20,000,000

Czechoslovakia	319,000
France	391,000
Germany	2,000,000
Greece	391,000
Japan	953,000
Poland	6,000,000
Soviet Union	7,700,000
Yugoslavia	1,400,000

An important doctrine of the air war on all sides was widespread bombing of civilian populations in urban areas (so-called saturation bombing); the cities of Rotterdam, Coventry, London, Berlin, Dresden, and Tokyo were deliberately attacked. It is estimated that the atomic bombs dropped by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan killed, respectively, 70,000 and 35,000 people.^c

a. *Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged*. 2nd ed. New York: Publishers Guild, 1966.

b. Mercer, Derrick, ed. *Chronicle of the Second World War*. Essex, UK: Longman Group, 1990, p. 668.

c. Jablonski, Edward. *Flying Fortress*. New York: Doubleday, 1965, p. 285.

Discussion Questions

- Are deliberate attacks against civilians legitimate acts of war?
- Were deliberate attacks on civilians during the Second World War acts of terrorism?
- If these attacks are acts of terrorism, are some attacks justifiable acts of terrorism?
- Is there such a thing as justifiable terrorism? Is terrorism *malum in se* or *malum prohibitum*?
- Is the practice of total war by individuals or small and poorly armed groups different from its practice by nations and standing armies? How so or how not?

RECOMMENDED READINGS

The following publications provide an introduction to terrorism and the global environment:

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